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Abstract: This article reviews the administrative implications of the fiscal gap
that has opened up in all OECD countries as a result of the financial crisis. It
outlines the pressures for fiscal consolidation, which will lead to deep and pro-
longed real cuts in public spending. The article examines the political debate in
the United Kingdom and stresses the exceptional difficulties facing all adminis-
trative systems over what might be a decade of spending restraint. Accordingly,
it anticipates an emphasis on “cutback management” as last seen in the United
Kingdom in the 1980s, and reflects on the successful Canadian experience.
Three hypotheses are advanced: failure to control spending; success based on
the New Public Management; and the need to adapt government capabilities to
manage cutbacks. Implementing large real cuts in the face of political and
administrative pressures for budget maximization will require extraordinary
political determination. Intelligent and constructive definition and implementa-
tion of spending priorities will require a reconfiguration of administrative sys-
tems, which may amount to a new paradigm.
Keywords: cutback management, fiscal consolidation, budgeting, administrative
reform
THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
It has become an overworked cliche to observe that “when America sneezes, Europe
catches the cold.” Nonetheless, this echo of the 1929 stock market crash presents a nice
image of contagion, and we have seen that when America goes into recession, Europe
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and Asia have to fight to avoid depression. But as with so many economic trends, the
U.S. financial crisis was also a British financial crisis. It appeared initially as a crisis
generated by the free-wheeling free-market capitalism that the French and the Germans
are apt to criticize as the “Anglo-Saxon model” of an individualistic liberal market, dri-
ven by market signals and energized by greed. Accordingly, the early responses in con-
tinental Europe could be captured by that wonderful German word Schadenfreude,
which roughly translates as delight in the misfortune of others. This seemed to be a cri-
sis of neoliberal capitalism and to signify a swing in the pendulum of economic fashion
away from the Thatcher/Reagan prescriptions of unleashed markets and back to the
more sober, coordinated, and solidaristic models found in Germany or Japan.
Unfortunately, the financial crisis metamorphosed into a global economic crisis,
with spectacular falls in economic activity during 2008 and a fall in export demand
and trade that hit the big exporting countries of Germany, Japan, and China especially
hard. We have experienced a synchronized global recession, which appears singularly
unfair to those countries with responsible financial systems and conservative lending
practices.
The response to the economic crisis has been a return to strong interventionist gov-
ernment, which has also been partially globally synchronized through the G-20. Mon-
etary policy instruments of low interest rates and credit easing failed to give traction,
so governments turned to fiscal policy and to Keynesian solutions. This was, in
Skidelsky’s words, The Return of the Master (Skidelsky 2009), and governments have
injected vast resources into financial, product, and consumer markets in order to pre-
vent the recession from turning into a depression.
The outcome has been a huge fiscal gap between falling revenue and rising expen-
diture, bringing a stunning increase in government borrowing, a rapidly rising projec-
tion of government debt, and a disgraceful socialization of private debt with highly
controversial transfers of costs from bankers and property owners to the state. This has
precipitated a rerun of history. The cycles of capitalism have taken us “back to the
future,” and the United Kingdom, like all European countries, is facing a “fiscal crisis
of the state” with sinister echoes of the late 1970s (O’Connor 1973).
The global recession and the fiscal crisis have momentous implications for the role
of government, the design and intensity of regulation, the tension between globaliza-
tion and the nation-state, and choices about the most desirable variant of the capitalist
model. This article is concerned with a more focused issue, public administration in an
age of austerity or scarcity. In another echo of the late 1970s, “cutback management”
is back on the agenda (see Dunsire and Hood 1989).
The impending age of austerity can be captured in the modest but threatening
phrase “fiscal consolidation”—in other words, efforts to cap, and eventually to reduce,
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the unprecedented increase in government debt. One measure of the terrifying scale of
the fiscal catastrophe that confronts most governments is debt as a percentage of GDP.
Table 1 indicates that no OECD country has escaped a huge deterioration in public
finances but that some are in a far worse absolute position than others. Compared with
historic expectations that a deficit of 3 percent of GDP was excessively high (this was
the limit in the euro zone before the crisis), the recent Irish, British, and U.S. double-
digit borrowing appears unsustainable.
Under these circumstances, with an eye to reassuring international credit markets,
governments have announced plans to embark on fiscal consolidation by closing the
annual spending gap and reducing the long-term debt burden. The OECD has classi-
fied consolidation plans into three categories: countries that do not need to consoli-
date, those assumed to consolidate over three years, and those assumed to consolidate
over seven years. Table 2 presents the classification of nine sample countries.
All countries listed in the table face fiscal pressure, but the worst problems are
faced by Ireland, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Fiscal consolidation can
be achieved by increasing revenue (raising taxes), cutting expenditures, or both. In
practice, expenditure cuts are likely to bear the brunt of the reduction. How times have
changed!
The United Kingdom, like virtually all OECD countries, has enjoyed a decade of
prosperity and steady growth, which Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of Eng-
land, first referred to in 2003 as the NICE years (Non-Inflationary Continuous Expan-
sion). In the last seven years, public expenditure in the United Kingdom, as a percent-
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Table 1. Government Deficits as a Percentage of GDP
2007 2010 Deterioration
Korea +4.7 -2.3 7.0
Italy -1.5 -5.8 4.3
Canada +1.6 -5.9 7.5
Germany 0.2 -6.2 6.0
France -2.7 -7.9 5.2
Japan -2.5 -8.7 6.2
USA -2.9 -11.2 8.3
Ireland +0.2 -13.6 13.8
UK -2.7 -14.0 11.3
Euro zone -0.7 -7.0 6.3
All OECD -1.4 -8.8 7.4
Note: Countries are ranked in order of 2010 debt. Annual fiscal surplus (+) or deficit (-) is given as a percentage of GDP.
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 85, June 2009, Table 4.4, 231.
age of GDP (which was itself rising), rose from 36.3 in 1999-2000 to 41 in 2007-08
(Treasury 2009a, 65, Table 4.1). But to cite the Bible (Genesis 41: 29-31): “There
came seven years of great plenty throughout the land. . . . And there shall arise after
them seven lean years of famine; and all the plenty shall be forgotten. . . . It shall be
very grievous.” It does look as if the United Kingdom, among others, is facing seven
lean years. But while Pharaoh took Joseph’s sage advice and put aside reserves for the
lean years, the United Kingdom’s administrative systems have no reserves to draw
upon and face a truly grievous level of threatened cuts that has not been seen since the
1920s.
In this setting, the whole focus of British politics has shifted, to a remarkable
degree, to fiscal policy. This reflects a renewed emphasis on economic policy in a
recession but also the coincidence of the economic and the political cycles. At the time
of writing, Gordon Brown’s Labor government was fighting a general election to be
held on May 6, 2010, and the campaign is revolving around options for public spend-
ing cuts. Inescapably, the election will be determined by the state of the economy, how
the financial crisis has been managed, and the credibility of proposals for dealing with
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Table 2. Fiscal Consolidation Plans by Percentage of GDP
Assumed Gross financial liabilities
consolidation (% of GDP)
2010-17 2007 2010 2017
No exceptional consolidation
Korea 1.2 26 39 49
Consolidation over three years
Canada 5.0 64 82 67
Germany 4.7 65 84 71
France 3.2 70 94 99
Italy 3.0 112 127 112
Japan 4.2 167 200 208
Consolidation over seven years
United States 9.4 63 98 103
Ireland 7.0 28 80 125
United Kingdom 7.1 47 89 125
Euro zone 71 89 85
All OECD 74 100 104
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 85, June 2009, Table 4.4, 231.
Note: The “assumed consolidation” figure is an OECD estimate based on removal of fiscal stimulus spending followed by
a saving of 1 percent of GDP every year for zero, three, or seven years. The gross financial liabilities represent the
projected overall government debt burden as a percentage of GDP if consolidation is successful.
the aftermath and achieving a robust recovery. The Conservative opposition has man-
aged to move the debate beyond market failure and away from questions of bankers’
greed, regulatory failure, and redesign of the economic model onto public debt and fis-
cal policy—specifically, how quickly the debt should be reduced, whether this should
be achieved by increased taxes or decreased spending, and which taxes or cuts are
most desirable.
This is not only a technical debate; it has become very political and ideological. The
big question concerns the size and role of the state. In the wake of market failure,
should the state become more active? Britain’s finance minister, Alistair Darling, has
expressed Labour’s case for an activist, enabling state, remarking that “people rightly
talk about the invisible hand of the market, but it goes alongside the enabling hand of
government” and arguing that “the global recession and the global response to tackle it
have demonstrated the difference that strong, active government can make” (Darling
2009, 5). The Conservatives, under David Cameron, who polls show are likely to win
the election, are more skeptical of the enlarged state. They argue for a reduction in the
burdens on business, cuts in the public sector, and a fierce regime of expenditure reduc-
tions rather than tax increases. In short, the debate is repeating many of the arguments
of the 1970s and early 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher’s attack on a bloated, inefficient
public sector ushered in two decades of neoliberal policy and relaxed regulation.
Whoever wins the UK election, there will be historically unprecedented cuts in
public spending. This paper examines the implications of those cuts for public admin-
istration from four perspectives: the timing and scale of the cuts, the political debate,
administration under scarcity, and the strategy and tactics of spending cuts. It concen-
trates on the United Kingdom, partly because of space constraints but also because the
UK situation is one of the most serious and because, in this area of national spending,
Europe is disaggregated.
In relation to fiscal policy and public spending, the countries in the euro zone have
to operate within macroeconomic policy constraints, but the details of spending pro-
grams are still nationally determined. The EU Stability and Growth Pact requires EU
members to limit their budget deficits to 3 percent of GDP, but this applies with more
force to the members of the euro zone; and in any case, even before the recession, the
rules had been breached sufficiently often to call into question the credibility of the
Pact (Fingland and Bailey 2008). As a spending authority, the EU is virtually irrele-
vant. It is famously a “regulatory polity” with trivial revenues, a small amount of inte-
grationist spending, and a tiny bureaucracy. This may be beginning to change in rela-
tion to the euro zone, where huge budget deficits prejudice the credit rating of individ-
ual countries and, by limiting their ability to borrow, threaten to destroy the integrity
of the euro.
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This specter of possible defaults on sovereign debt became an issue at the begin-
ning of 2010 with the revelation that the Greek budget deficit had been concealed. The
new government of George Papandreou admitted that, instead of a deficit of 3.7 per-
cent, the real deficit for 2009 was nearer to 12.7 percent. Attempts to cut the deficit
have already provoked civil unrest and public sector strikes. All this has alarmed the
financial markets and threatened a downgrade by the credit rating agencies that would
have pushed up Greek government borrowing costs to penal levels (Smith 2010). At
the time of writing, an EU-coordinated financial rescue package was being debated
under the threat that a Greek default would inevitably shift the focus of the financial
markets to other highly indebted European countries, including Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, and Italy.
For the argument advanced here, the key factor is the need to establish credibility
in international bond markets. Since the UK deficit for 2009-10 is, at 12.6 percent,
almost exactly the same as that of Greece, it is not difficult to see the danger to the
United Kingdom’s creditworthiness. This ramps up the pressure for UK fiscal consoli-
dation, but it does so through the politically objectionable and morally dubious vehicle
of the international financial markets, precisely the agencies that created the problems
in the first place.
THE TIMING AND SCALE OF SPENDING CUTS
In the public sector, 2009 had the air of a phony war or the calm before the storm.
Although the Treasury is budgeting for cuts, they will not begin to bite until the mid-
dle of 2010. The posture of the finance minister has been like that of St. Augustine,
who asked God to give him chastity and continence, but not to give them yet; he and
the prime minister have been adamant that cuts should not be implemented until the
economic recovery is clearly established. The fear of prejudicing the recovery by early
budget cuts is shared by most economists, but there is also an argument on the left and
among the unions that deep cuts are not necessary and are pandering to a right-wing
agenda.
The left and the unions argue that governments are not like households, that the
Keynesian magic should be allowed to work, that in a low-inflation, low-interest envi-
ronment public debt is easy to finance and, in any case, that total UK debt is not exces-
sive by international standards. This provides an important political context, because it
will cast doubt on the legitimacy of the deep cuts that politicians have proposed, and it
will reinforce the confrontational arguments of public sector unions, which are far
more concerned with the failure of markets, excessive financial remuneration, and
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inequality and unemployment than they are with the size of public debt. Prime Minis-
ter Gordon Brown appears sympathetic to this perspective. He has argued strongly in
European and international arenas that coordinated fiscal stimulus should be sustained,
and he could not bring himself even to utter the word “cuts” until September 2009,
when it appeared in a speech to the Trades Union Congress.
Despite this hesitation, the green shoots of recovery will expose the spending
deficits to the frost of budget cuts. The United Kingdom technically emerged from
recession in the fourth quarter of 2009, and as soon as stable growth is resumed, the
government will have to reduce expenditures. This section reviews the likely scale of
this fiscal retrenchment.
The British government plans expenditure over a three-year planning horizon, so
that spending plans published in November 2008 outlined spending for the years
2009-10 to 2011-12. The 2008 plans forecast an annual borrowing requirement of
£175 billion for 2009-10, which is 12.4 percent of GDP. They outline the intention to
reduce borrowing over eight years with a final target of £90 billion a year or 6.4 per-
cent of national income (IFS 2009b, 2). Through a combination of tax increases and
spending reductions, this would eliminate the structural budget deficit. The Treasury
plans anticipate that half that reduction would take place over the four years 2010-11
to 2013-14.
The reduction would be dominated by spending cuts, so that 20 percent of it would
be achieved by tax increases, 30 percent by cuts in capital spending, and the remaining
50 percent by cuts in current spending. The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) has calcu-
lated that the cuts, at constant prices adjusting for inflation, over the three years 2011-
12 to 2013-14, will reduce capital spending by 17.5 percent and increase current
spending by 0.7 percent, cutting total expenditure by a mere 0.1 percent. That appears
modest and relatively painless, but it understates the administrative challenge and
vastly understates the scale of the likely cuts, for three reasons.
First, the government divides spending into the categories of departmental expen-
diture limits (DELs), which represent controllable spending, and annually managed
expenditure (AME), which is demand-led and not subject to annual control, such as
social security benefits and debt interest (see table 3).
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Table 3. Planned Public Spending for 2009-2010
DELs (departmental expenditure limits) £342.1 billion
AME (annually managed expenditure) £265.9 billion
Capital spending £63.4 billion
Total managed expenditure £671.4 billion
Source: Treasury 2009b, 26.
Internal Treasury forecasts leaked to the press in September 2009 showed that the
Treasury expects substantial real increases in debt servicing costs and social security
spending. This increases the AME spending and puts far greater pressure on the con-
trollable DEL spending. As a result, the IFS observed that “this would be the tightest
squeeze in spending on public services since the UK was negotiating its spending plan
with the International Monetary Fund in the late 1970s” (IFS 2009b, 32).
Second, some public services may be protected from cuts. The Labor government
has undertaken to protect the National Health Service (NHS), schools, and internation-
al aid. Since the annual DEL of the NHS is around £73 billion, the other DEL spend-
ing categories will need to be cut even deeper, by an amount that the IFS calculates at
a massive 12.9 percent over the two years 2011-12 and 2012-13 (IFS 2010, S7).
Third, the government estimates were almost certainly too optimistic. They includ-
ed, for instance, £9 billion of “efficiency savings” to be achieved by 2013-14, but the
details remain hazy. Equally optimistically, the plan assumed the resumption of eco-
nomic growth rising to at least 3.5 percent beginning in 2011-12 and continuing at that
level (Treasury 2009b, 2).
Overall, the IFS’s understated conclusion that “whichever scenario you look at,
public spending seems set for a protracted squeeze” appears correct. The enormity of
that squeeze is further underlined by the conclusion that “much of the rise in spending
on public services under Labor looks set to be reversed” (IFS 2009b, 33, 34). This is a
defining moment or, for historical institutionalists, a “critical juncture” (Hall and Tay-
lor 1996, 942). Ten years worth of policy initiatives, spending aspirations, and service
growth are going to be put into reverse. Where will the cuts fall? And how is the civil
service going to deliver those cuts? Self-mutilation is an unattractive prospect.
THE POLITICAL DEBATE
Decisions about spending priorities are by definition political, but the whole debate
in Britain had become highly politicized by the autumn of 2009. Politicians have come
to recognize, in the words of a respected Liberal Democrat, that “the central issue
emerging now in the UK—and the one which will dominate politics for the next few
years—is the size of the UK government budget borrowing and deficits, and govern-
ment debt” (Cable 2009, 5). The spending debate has been seized upon by the opposi-
tion parties and has become quickly absorbed into adversarial party politics that, again,
has echoes of the 1970s and 1980s. The political parties find the debate convenient
because it can settle nicely into traditional class ideologies, offers endless possibilities
for point scoring, and provides a battleground for the 2010 election and material for the
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party manifestos with which parties seek to attract voters.
Based on the early skirmishes in this spending battle, a series of fault lines have
begun to emerge that help to differentiate the policies of the main parties and the
spending choices that will confront the administrative machine. The most contested
issues are (1) tax increases versus spending cuts, (2) big government versus small gov-
ernment, (3) evaluation of the public sector, (4) management of the recovery, and (5)
whether to see the crisis as an opportunity for radical initiatives.
Tax increases versus spending cuts: The question of whether to secure fiscal con-
solidation mainly by increasing taxes or by cutting spending is a classic left/right
debate, with the left certain to emphasize progressive tax increases. One highly per-
ceptive analysis by Giles Wilkes (2009) has provided ammunition for both sides.
Wilkes pointed out that the United Kingdom’s extraordinary fiscal deterioration is not
due to recessionary spending but to an amazing collapse in revenues. The tax yield
was artificially inflated by credit bubbles, which boosted corporate, property, and
income taxes that have now evaporated. He broke down the causes of government
debt as shown in table 4.
This analysis suggests that it would be very difficult to rebuild the tax base. How-
ever, Wilkes went on to argue in favor of property taxes directed at housing by abol-
ishing the family home exemption from the capital gains tax or introducing a levy on
expensive housing (the so-called mansion tax). He argued that this would be equitable
and would have a minimal impact on entrepreneurship and growth because it would
not tax economic activity.
Big or small government: The financial crisis has clearly reinvigorated the debate
about public versus private, state versus market, the benefits of state intervention, and
the prospects for a new version of the New Deal (Gamble 2010, 13). The crisis should
arguably have finally laid to rest the “end of history” Reagan/Thatcher consensus that
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Loss of “bubble” revenues 9
Preexisting structural gap 16
Loss of revenues 25
“Normal” borrowing 37
Total debt 100
Source: Wilkes 2009, 38.
government is malign and that the market provides freedom and prosperity. Yet the
critics of big government and the defenders of market freedom are renewing their cri-
tique of the state, and Labor has been slow to assert governmental authority. Gordon
Brown’s government has appeared weak in its approach to intensified financial regula-
tion and the lightning rod issue of excessive bankers’ bonuses. In fearsome rhetoric,
and echoing the analysis of former International Monetary Fund chief economist
Simon Johnson (2009), Monbiot said that “the political establishment in is thrall to the
financial establishment. . . . to sustain this parasitic industry every other sector must be
cut” (Monbiot 2009). In particular, the government is a reluctant owner of a large sec-
tion of the banking sector but appears wholly unwilling to deploy its ownership rights.
Despite their reluctance to confront the banks, the finance minister and other senior
ministers have affirmed the benefits of an active interventionist state. Indeed, Gordon
Brown’s main claim to electoral support is his role in responding boldly and assertive-
ly to the financial crisis and playing a global leadership role praised by many, includ-
ing the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman (2008). Brown’s most powerful minister, the
business secretary, Lord Peter Mandelson, has declared:
We reject the argument of those on the right who argue that the state is an obsta-
cle to human freedom. . . . The big success story of British social democracy in
the last twelve years has been the rescue, revival and rehabilitation of public ser-
vices (Mandelson 2009).
It might be expected that the pendulum of administrative fashion would be swing-
ing back towards a larger, more interventionist role for government.
Evaluation of the public sector: Despite the defects in private sector markets and
the credit bubbles that created the financial crisis, politicians and the media continue to
express resentment towards the public sector, which is perceived to be too large and to
have overly generous employment conditions, including noncontributory or subsi-
dized pensions. Moreover, the increases in public spending over the last ten years have
not increased public sector productivity. One theme of spending reduction is therefore
to target the workforce through cuts in numbers, cuts in pension entitlements and,
especially popular, a public sector pay freeze combined with pay cuts for the most
senior public sector managers.
Defenders of public sector employees point out that most of them are poorly paid
and deserve some job security in compensation. This argument is made forcibly by
public sector unions such as Unison. Although union power in the United Kingdom
has weakened markedly since the 1980s, the public sector is still strongly unionized
(59 percent against only 17 percent in the private sector—DTI 2006), and cuts will
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almost certainly bring strikes and industrial actions.
Management of the recovery: The reflex assumption in the debate about cuts is that
they should not inhibit the resumption of substantial and sustained economic growth.
During the election campaign, the need to postpone cuts in order to sustain the recov-
ery became a central plank in Gordon Brown’s campaign rhetoric. This basic Keyne-
sian tactic is, of course, inconsistent with the pre-2008 neoliberal policy stance that
growth requires a reduction in state spending, regulation, and intervention. Such
neoliberal assumptions were too embedded to be abandoned easily, but they were tem-
pered by the new popularity of Keynesian intervention, a loss of sympathy for finan-
cial lobbies, a renewed interest in a “modern” industrial policy, and a powerful critique
of the very concept of economic growth from the green and climate-change lobbies.
How this will affect the details of program reductions is difficult to forecast. There
might be a greater reluctance to cut budgets that affect training, business support, or
procurement. One important issue will be how spending cuts affect the rapid growth in
public-private partnerships, outsourcing, and service delivery by the private sector. As
regards capital spending in particular, much of the cost is borne by the private sector
through the Private Finance Initiative and is not included in official statistics of gov-
ernment debt. Reducing spending may suggest more private delivery, but gaining bet-
ter control over budgets and value for money may encourage government to bring
more services in-house.
In any event, the political debate insists that spending should be assessed in terms
of its contribution to growth, which implies limiting the costs to the corporate sector.
There is an expectation of a return to normality, which is odd since the last seven years
of growth have, by definition, been abnormal. We have seen a lack of political imagi-
nation, especially in the context of climate change and sustainability. It might have
been thought that a financial crisis would provide an opportunity to tilt the economy
and government policy more deliberately towards a steady-state, sustainable economy
in which GDP growth receives a lower priority. Such ideas have entered the public
domain with increased discussion of the “politics of happiness” (Layard 2005) and
alternative indices of well-being (NEF 2009a; Coyle forthcoming), but as yet the main
political parties have not been willing to transcend the commitment to economic
growth as a dominant aim of economic policy.
Opportunities for radical initiatives: A fundamental shift in spending priorities is
inevitable. As in all crises (Boin, ‘t Hart, and McConnell 2009), this will present
opportunities for radical policy innovation. One such innovation would be to allow
local authorities and decentralized agencies to make choices about what to cut, per-
haps in dialogue with their clientele. This has been advocated by the Liberal Democ-
rats (Cable 2009, 34) and builds on the recognition that many local councils have
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developed impressive performance and delivery records that can be exploited and gen-
eralized (see Audit Commission 2009; Lee 2009).
A second innovation would be to encourage the growth of “social enterprise,” a
third sector of nonprofit voluntary or cooperative organizations that work within mul-
tipartner networks to deliver personalized services in areas like care for the elderly,
social housing, and mental health (Bartlett 2009). A third would be to use reconfigura-
tion of spending to pursue a green agenda, addressing climate change issues by invest-
ing in green infrastructure, “green collar” jobs, and green capitalism as advocated by
Barack Obama in the United States and by left-leaning environmentalists in the United
Kingdom (NEF, 2009b).
A fourth area, unfortunately almost inconceivable in the British political climate,
would be to sacrifice the sacred cow of the NHS. The truly huge public expenditures
are personal social services and health care. A move in health care towards a scheme
of compulsory insurance, funded by individuals and employees on the Canadian, Ger-
man, or French model, would have the potential to generate substantial savings. Final-
ly, and this is far more likely, government could abolish universal benefits and make
them more targeted and based on need. This was already under discussion by Labor
under the rubric of “progressive universalism,” and it would target the cross-subsidies
enjoyed by the middle classes in the shape of child benefits, student loans, and even
the old age pension. To means-test these benefits would be controversial, but here, as
in other areas of social service delivery, the devil is in the detail-how these savings are
implemented is as important as the changes themselves.
Overall, then, the political agenda has shifted decisively towards a debate over
cuts, but the party programs remain inchoate. The party manifestos presented to the
public during the spring 2010 election campaign, especially the Conservative mani-
festo, will condition the conduct of British public administration for the next decade.
We have yet to see a distinctive, inspirational vision emerge. Instead, party leaders are
very hesitant to be open about the substantial and even savage cuts that all political
and economic specialists see as inevitable.
What is truly extraordinary is that the great debate has moved so firmly from mar-
ket failure to spending cuts. The fact is that the vulnerable in society—the poor, the
unemployed, the ill, children, and the elderly—are going to pay a price for the finan-
cial crisis. In these circumstances, we might have expected a more determined com-
mitment to a wealth tax, the elimination of large bonuses paid to bankers, a redesign of
the financial system, taming of hedge funds and investment banking practices,
redesign of corporate governance, a new industrial policy, or a shift to a sustainable
society. Sadly, the headlines are all about budget cuts, so how will the British civil ser-
vice respond?
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ADMINISTRATION UNDER SCARCITY
It is immensely difficult to make immediate real reductions in public spending. The
British government achieved real spending cuts in only six of the past forty-five years
(1977, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1996, and 1997—IFS 2009a), and those were small. In the
most thorough scholarly account of the control of public spending, Thain and Wright
(1995, 2) confirmed that “the Thatcher years also show how extraordinarily difficult it
was to cut the real level of spending.” With this background, the blithe discussion by
politicians, think tanks, and the media of where and how much to cut public spending
has an air of unreality. The big question is, how can the civil service deliver spending
cuts without provoking breakdowns and crises that will negate many of the assumed
gains?
We can try to answer this question through three hypotheses based on projected
cuts of 5 percent per annum in core budgets (DEL) over the four years of 2011-12 to
2014-15. That would involve cuts of 20 percent in the core budgets of £300 billion,
building up to an annual cut of about £60 billion after four years, or a cut of almost 10
percent after four years in total public spending of £671 billion. In other words, the
hypotheses are based on a level of cuts in public spending that has no peacetime
precedent in the United Kingdom. The three hypotheses concern the likelihood of suc-
cess; the first is pessimistic, the second optimistic, and the third systemic.
Breakdown hypothesis: The present UK system of government and adminis-
tration is incapable of delivering the spending reductions.
Managerial hypothesis: The reforms to the public sector associated with the
New Public Management (NPM) have equipped the civil service to deliver cuts
based on well-articulated political priorities.
Redefinition hypothesis: Implementing cuts will requite a redefinition of col-
lective political-administrative leadership.
The Breakdown Hypothesis
The apparatus of public administration exists mainly to spend public money—that
is what it does. If the supply of money is drastically reduced, it is like turning down
the taps in an irrigation system: the crops wither and the harvest fails. The whole
process of budgeting and expenditure control is a core activity and a fundamental
annual cycle in almost all public organizations. If that cycle is reconfigured, it will
have an impact on all administrative activity.
In terms of institutional theory, a major contraction in spending will affect the regu-
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lative, normative, and cognitive constraints that have built up over decades. Public
organizations will have to revise their rule systems, redefine acceptable standards, and
adjust expectations. The basic activities that make up the job of a senior public ser-
vant—such as planning, coordinating, leading, motivating, and organizing—will all
have to be redesigned in the face of spending cutbacks. Familiar routines, long-accept-
ed compromises, and common goals will all be destabilized. How do you coordinate
with other agencies when you have no resources to contribute? How do you plan for
two years ahead when your budget might evaporate? How do you motivate subordi-
nates whose jobs are under threat, whose salaries have been cut, and whose pensions
are no longer guaranteed? All these tasks can be achieved, but each has to be achieved
differently. The existing civil service machine cannot deliver real expenditure reduc-
tions; it has no reverse gear.
Another way of expressing this skepticism is through the theory of the budget max-
imizing bureaucrat as analyzed by Niskanen (1971) and other exponents of public
choice theory. One influential theory of public administration is therefore centered on
officials seeking a greater allocation of public spending:
The great appeal of the Niskanen model lies . . . in its capacity to account for the
well-established propensity of bureaucrats to seek larger budgets. It does make
sense to assume that bureaucrats attempt to maximize their budgets and to make
that assumption the central proposition of a theory of bureaucratic behavior.
(Blais and Dion 1991, 359).
We can perhaps accept this budget maximizing bias without accepting the entirety
of the public choice approach. If we do so, it logically leads to the conclusion that sys-
tem-wide expenditure cuts are unnatural, like asking doctors to injure patients or
teachers to mislead students. A less flattering parallel might be drawn with banking
and the explosive issue of bankers’ excessive remuneration and bonuses. Just as
bankers have been vilified as greedy bonus maximizers, so civil servants may be criti-
cized as greedy budget maximizers, both providing examples of a logical pursuit of
individual utility but both producing overall public damage in an unfortunate reversal
of Adam Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand. In any event, faced with this pre-
dominant behavioral incomprehension and rejection of cuts, the civil service may not
disintegrate, but it will certainly fail.
This prognosis of failure is rooted in a rich seam of historical and comparative
examples. Canada provided a rare and now widely cited example of success in the mid
1990s, but “between 1984 and 1993 the Government of Canada made a total of 22
budget cuts, each more difficult than the previous and each more demoralizing for the
Public Service” (Bourgon 2009, 16). These initial failures were explored by Savoie,
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who reviewed the intense pressures for growth in spending, expressed some sympathy
for Niskanen’s analysis, and examined the failure of “rational budgeting” devices in
the absence of complete political support (Savoie 1990, 335-47).
For the United Kingdom, Thain and Wright developed a theory of “negotiated dis-
cretion” to interpret the relationship between the Treasury as the expenditure controller
and the spending departments. They concluded that in a domestic spending crisis,
“negotiated discretion would become untenable” and “it would be essential to lock the
Cabinet and hence individual ministers collectively and individually into a system
capable of delivering unpalatable outcomes” (Thain and Wright 1995, 547). A focus
on the role of the Treasury as the most powerful department in British government is
thus central to the discussion. It has been argued that a greater focus on expenditure
control is needed—married, perhaps, with an independent Office of Budget Responsi-
bility to provide transparent validation (Turnbull 2010). Without major organizational
and cultural change verging on a paradigm shift, the hypothesis of breakdown and fail-
ure presents a dangerous but so far barely recognized challenge to the politicians who
hope to achieve unprecedented and eye-watering cuts.
The Managerial Hypothesis
From a far more optimistic perspective, it can be argued that two decades of public
sector management reform have transformed the managerial competence of civil ser-
vice managers such that real cuts can be defined and implemented. After all, the model
has been the private sector, where company recovery and “turnround management” is
far less rare. If managers in the public sector can be given clear directions on which
objectives to prioritize, and what financial envelope is tolerable, then arguably they are
equipped to deliver.
The expectation would be that ministers would define clear priorities, including
cutting entire programs. They would prioritize in terms of outcomes (not inputs) and
would exploit managerial autonomy and ability by simply allocating a sum of
resources to accounting units and authorizing them to achieve outcomes in any legal
way within their financial envelope. This approach of “bulk” or “framework” budget-
ing plays to some of the strengths of the New Public Management, most notably the
following:
• Government increasingly operates through discrete units in departments or agen-
cies that have a degree of managerial autonomy and more-or-less empowered
managers or boards.
• The focus in policy and expenditure planning has already moved towards the
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definition of general outcomes and away from inputs or even outputs. These
were embodied in the thirty Public Service Agreements contained in the 2007
Comprehensive Spending Review, so that the concept of flexible outcome
achievement is already familiar.
• Government units have far better information about their budgets and activities
than they did even ten years ago. Partly this is a result of the digital revolution,
but it also reflects huge strides in government accounting with the development
of cost-center accounting, accrual accounting, and financial reporting. Govern-
ment units can therefore analyze their activities and share that analysis with
clients and stakeholders more effectively.
• Performance management has been firmly embedded in local government, in
many agencies and central departments. This should provide management with
information about what works, what is cost-effective, and what the outcomes
would be of reducing or closing expenditure programs.
• Partnerships have become the norm in many service areas. Delivery agencies
work with other levels of government, with the voluntary sector, and with pri-
vate sector service providers. On the one hand, this may make it easier to exit
from spending commitments and to close down programs. On the other hand,
it may make it possible to transfer responsibilities and to regulate instead of
funding certain activities. The whole area of contracting out, of delivering
through public service companies and public/private partnerships, is full of
both potential and pitfalls.
Cutting public expenditure by relying on the reforms introduced under the NPM
would involve the same return to the politics/administration dichotomy that lies at the
heart of the NPM. Ministers would set priorities, but in this case they would prioritize
what is to be cut. The implementation would be delegated down the managerial hierar-
chy. This approach could accommodate a policy of “equal misery” with, say, a 10 per-
cent cut in every budget, or it could preserve some programs and eliminate others. The
key would be giving up central control and direction of implementation. It would
require flexibility over areas such as staffing and contracting out and support for radi-
cal initiatives. In this sense, it would be relatively high risk, but it would have the great
advantage of more localized decision making, which could reach out to clients, part-
ners, and the public to secure greater understanding of the options for spending cuts.
Could the managers, organizations, and tools created by the NPM rise to the chal-
lenge? For some observers, the NPM is part of the problem, not the solution. There is
a danger that single-purpose organizations will fight cuts even more determinedly and
that the NPM will inhibit the development of collective and collegiate leadership. Rec-
ognizing these dangers would be a further challenge for cutback managers, who might
have to be prepared to limit agency autonomy or to abolish some agencies entirely.
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The Redefinition Hypothesis
To avoid the breakdown hypothesis, and to exploit the managerial hypothesis, gov-
ernment at the center will have to be redefined. To achieve real cuts in spending, min-
isters will have to work together collectively and engage in a creative partnership with
senior civil servants. Together they will have to create new procedures, establish new
principles, and change expectations towards a new vision. Regaining fiscal sovereignty
will have to become a metapolicy—a political obsession.
One widely cited example of a government achieving huge real spending reduc-
tions and re-establishing fiscal sovereignty is the case of Canada, which cut real
spending by 10 percent in the three years 1994-95 to 1996-97 (Bourgon 2009, 26) and
managed to break away from earlier failures to cut spending. Jocelyn Bourgon was
head of the Canadian federal civil service from 1994 to 1999, and her account gives a
positive civil service view, but one that is consistent with academic studies (Swimmer
1996; Lindquist 2006). Bourgon emphasized transformations in leadership and part-
nership, and specifically:
• the total commitment of Prime Minister Jean Chretien, leader of the Liberal
government, and of Finance Minister Paul Martin
• the cooperative and collective commitment of all ministers
• the partnership between ministers and deputy ministers (senior civil servants)
• a zero-base budgeting assumption but flexibility in devising solutions
• a comprehensive ‘program review’ approach to all government programs in
which nothing was excluded or protected
• the open nature of the exercise, with full consultation and transparency
She celebrated the success of the exercise, with cuts over three years ranging from
50 percent for transport to 3 percent for health care, and the number of federal
employees falling from 231,000 in 1994 to 187,000 in 1998. She emphasized the con-
tinued benign effects in terms of federal surpluses and concluded, “This Canadian case
study is an example of cabinet government at its finest” (Bourgon 2009, 33). But she
also identified a paradigmatic shift in the nature of Canadian Federal Government so
that “Program Review amounted to a profound realignment of the GoC’s role” (Bour-
gon 2009, 29).
A comparison of this Canadian example to the challenge facing the United King-
dom suggests that three governmental adaptations are essential. First, there should be a
return to cabinet government, the deterioration of which, in the practice and the consti-
tutional theory, began under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s but has deepened under
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. They have developed a presidential, domineering style
Cutback Management in the United Kingdom 101
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
of more personalized and unilateral decision making. The spending challenge will
require collective determination, not individual diktat. Individual ministers would need
to share a collective commitment to spending reductions and manage their depart-
ments with that end in mind and in cooperation with colleagues.
Second, cabinet ministers should rebuild their partnerships with the civil service
and especially with their permanent secretaries. Suspicion and even hostility towards
the civil service and local government is another legacy of the Thatcher period. Spend-
ing cuts will require whole-hearted civil service cooperation and will rely on civil ser-
vice reservoirs of information, expertise, enterprise, and dedication that are too easily
overlooked. This requires trust and a greater degree of mutual respect, which the Cabi-
net Secretary has sought to promote through public capability reviews of all govern-
ment departments that have focused on ways of improving the partnership between
ministers and civil servants in shared leadership (see Wilks 2007).
Third, the analytical capability and authority of the center of government will have
to be enhanced. There has been much discussion of the “hollowing out” of British
government, with legitimacy and capacity leaking away to the devolved governments,
the EU, independent agencies, and the private sector. Curiously, that hollowing out is
less marked in relation to public spending, in which the Treasury remains dominant,
but nonetheless, central organization and analytical capacity would have to be
strengthened. This would involve supplementing the capacity of the Treasury and
extending spending responsibility beyond the expenditure divisions of the Treasury.
The Treasury will have to overcome its instinct for detailed control and will have to
overcome latent distrust of it by spending departments and ministers. Just as war is too
important to be left to the generals, so fiscal consolidation is too important to be left to
the Treasury.
BLEEDING STUMPS AND FAIRY GOLD: 
CUTTING BUDGETS AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE RESISTANCE
The initial debates about spending cuts in the UK stressed, first, that efficiency sav-
ings would not be adequate to secure sufficient cuts, and second, that “salami-slicing”
involving indiscriminate across-the-board cuts should be avoided in favor of a compre-
hensive reconsideration of governmental priorities. To state the obvious, this means that
the “managerial efficiency” response of doing the same things but more efficiently will
not be enough, and that a means must be found to prioritize the activities of government.
Some political priorities were discussed above, but the process of converting them
into actual cuts, incorporated into operating budgets, is exceedingly difficult. Budget-
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ing in the public sector is famously dominated by incrementalism (Peters 2010, 239),
and the familiar ways of making cuts are based on an annual cycle of small increments
(or decrements) to existing budgets. Conventional options therefore include equal mis-
ery—reducing every budget by the same amount (this is the salami-slicing that politi-
cians reject); cash limits, letting inflation do the work; recruitment freezes, which
bring rough justice depending on how departures are clustered; and charging for pub-
lic services. These options are widely understood and, as Hood and Wright (1981,
203) pointed out, ‘the equal misery approach may have a very strong element of ratio-
nality about it.” It can be implemented rapidly, can be applied to the whole spending
portfolio, treats everyone equally, and does not require elaborate analysis, horse-trad-
ing, and political agonizing.
Not surprisingly, there has been consistent pressure for more rationality and priori-
tization in budgeting. The available techniques include PPBS (program, planning,
budgeting system), ZBB (zero-base budgeting), and the program review approach
used in Canada. The United Kingdom has been something of a trailblazer in seeking to
plan and prioritize in budgeting. It has developed a system of expenditure surveys,
which plan capital and current spending over a three-year time horizon. Under Gordon
Brown, the Treasury also introduced methods of identifying and controlling cash and
discretionary spending measured by accruals accounting similar to private-sector prac-
tices. This whole apparatus has been punctuated by periodic Comprehensive Spending
Reviews, the latest of which was in 2007, which have required departments to justify
their programs on a ZBB principle and to express them as outcomes rather than inputs.
The agreed funding and policy outcomes are then expressed as a series of Public Ser-
vice Agreements, which provide a mission statement for the department and constitute
a widely publicized set of goals and targets for which the department or agency can be
held accountable.
The United Kingdom would therefore appear to have effective machinery for con-
trolling public spending, centered on the Treasury and available to deliver cuts. But, to
return to the points about administrative behavior raised above, there is a huge litera-
ture and a great weight of experience to indicate that there will be immense resistance
to cuts. Budget maximization is a plausible goal for ministers as well as civil servants.
Their success, status, and power are all related to the size of the budget they control.
Their pursuit of extra resources is perfectly understandable. It is not too naive to sug-
gest that people enter politics to make a difference—to help fellow citizens or achieve
valued goals. This nearly always requires financial resources, so resistance to cuts is as
much a part of the political DNA as it is of administrative behavior.
Implementing spending cuts will therefore be exceedingly difficult, and the skills,
techniques, and leadership of cutback management will become highly valued. Cut-
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back managers will need to develop techniques to overcome resistance and will need
to approach their task with commitment but also with a healthy dose of skepticism.
There are a number of well-tried tactics for avoiding cuts, such as the “bleeding
stumps” and “fairy gold” approaches (Dunsire and Hood 1989, 169). The “bleeding
stumps” tactic involves offering up for cuts the most precious and popular services, as
when the British Foreign Office famously offered up cuts in the BBC World Service.
In a similar vein, the NHS might offer to abolish the family doctor, or local authorities
might propose charging for nursery education. The exposure of bleeding stumps gen-
erates public outrage, politicians recoil, and cuts are avoided. The “fairy gold” tactic
involves offering cuts in years two and three of the survey period-cuts that disappear
in year three like the gold at the end of a rainbow. The ability of spending departments
to pursue cynical tactics to foil cuts is aided by their control over information. Middle
managers responsible for defining and implementing programs have a far better sense
of what is wasteful or redundant and could be cut, and what is more productive. They
are typically hesitant to share that information with senior managers and especially
with the Treasury.
The tendency to protect services is reinforced by the imperative to protect staff and
clients. It is easy to predict that coalitions will be formed to protect services involving
professional public sector workers, their clients, other service providers such as chari-
ties and private sector companies, and public sector unions. These coalitions will not
be overcome by mere confrontation, and it is interesting that the Canadian cuts were
accompanied by an early retirement scheme and early departure incentives so that
“large personnel reductions were accomplished with few involuntary departures . . .
and without the labor unrest or service interruptions characteristic of other countries’
efforts to reduce the size of their public services” (Bourgon 2009, 29).
It can therefore safely be predicted that exceptional measures will become neces-
sary to cut spending in a way that minimizes harm and maximizes creative responses.
The Canadian example might be a useful guide for the United Kingdom and others; at
the very least, it demonstrates the need for deliberate planning. Cutback management
requires careful consideration, planning, organizational changes, and reconfiguration
of incentives in a way that entails a paradigmatic shift in the civil service as an institu-
tion. For instance, Conservative politicians have speculated on some radical reforms,
such as converting schools, agencies or even parts of departments into semiau-
tonomous cooperatives.
If politicians fail to take the lead, the prognosis is gloomy. As this issue went to
press, it remained to be seen whether, in the United Kingdom, the tactical considera-
tions of a general election would prevent politicians confronting the scale and impact
of real cuts. The temptation, also seen in current debates, is to promise new policies
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involving more rather than less spending. If politicians fail to lead, senior civil ser-
vants may need to prepare for the expenditure crisis that seems as certain a prediction
as is possible in the social sciences.
CONCLUSIONS
The political and administrative shapes of the public spending dilemmas are still
uncertain. In the United Kingdom, the agenda is still under contestation and will only
become clearer with the spending reviews that a new government will have to under-
take after the May election. This article offers five conclusions, which are partly a
summary of the argument presented here but also a plea for a renewed focus on cut-
back management as a set of concepts that we badly need to get right.
First, as has been argued here, severe and prolonged real cuts in public spending
are far harder to achieve than is recognized in current debates. There is a real risk that
attempts to cut will fail and will bring disruption and unnecessary hardship.
Second, effective cuts will require a unified political commitment and a willing-
ness to make very difficult political choices. The process of defining priorities and
specifying expenditure reductions is important and will require specialized machinery
at the center.
Third, effective cuts will not be made in the face of civil service opposition. A new
partnership with the civil service and with agencies and local government will be
essential. The managerial hypothesis suggests that the civil service may be far better
equipped than in the past to deliver real cuts, but only if it is empowered, motivated,
and treated sympathetically when it comes to downsizing.
Fourth, real cuts of this magnitude will require planning on a program basis. Some
large spending programs will have to be discontinued or redesigned, and this will
require a genuine public debate. Cuts of this magnitude cannot be secured surrepti-
tiously and must reflect a real deliberation about the shape of the economy and the
society. As in the Canadian case, this may involve a fundamental reconsideration of
the role of government in society.
Finally, and more ambitiously, this public spending crisis offers extraordinary
opportunities for creative reform, if parties and politicians have the imagination to
seize them, in areas ranging from conceiving a steady-state, sustainable economy to a
radical decentralization and empowering of the localities. As Rahm Emanuel, Barack
Obama’s chief of staff, remarked, “you never want to let a serious crisis go to waste”
(Wall Street Journal 2008). Will governments seize this opportunity?
One route available to governments is to recognize and utilize insights from policy
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studies. The analysis above suggests that, at least in the United Kingdom, it is as close
to a social science certainty as we can get to predict that historically unprecedented
expenditure cuts cannot be made under the present system without unacceptable dis-
ruption, inefficiency, and waste. This prediction of virtual chaos is doubly unfortunate
given the opportunities also reviewed above to exploit this critical juncture in a cre-
ative fashion. Accordingly, the final appeal presented here is to reinvent the subdisci-
pline of cutback management to identify, evaluate, and recommend mechanisms for
making politically rational choices. Some politicians are fond of saying that proce-
dures are irrelevant, machinery is a distraction, and the only thing that matters is
results. They are wrong.
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